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Abstract 
In times of crisis, policy makers call upon entrepreneurship as a remedy to an economic 
downturn. Yet, at these times new firms face intensified selection and survival hinges on 
heterogeneous capabilities. We examine how the founding innovative capabilities of new 
ventures created in the Netherlands in 2001-2006 affected their survival likelihood before, 
during and after the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. We estimate a piecewise exponential 
model linking survival times, from 2001 to 2015, to longitudinal innovation data from the 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS). New firms innovating within two years from their 
founding enjoy a long-term adaptive survival premium during and after the crisis. This 
premium and its duration over the stages of the crisis are contingent to the form of 
innovation: technological innovations entail a more effective and enduring premium, as 
compared to non-technological innovations, which can be even detrimental for survival.  
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1. Introduction  
Unexpected and disruptive events such as the global financial crisis create an extreme and 
perilous environment for firms. These events, or environmental jolts, produce a variety of 
responses by firms, leading to the survival of some and not of others (Meyer, 1982). The 
scope for a response by firms is bound by their resources, at three levels (Agarwal et al., 
2009). First, organisations differ in the resources they directly control. The immediate effect 
of a financial crisis is to impose tighter liquidity and resource constraints, which lower 
survival (Clarke et al., 2012). Second, organisations differ in resources they do not directly 
control but can access by ownership relationships with other organisations. Environmental 
jolts alter the odds of survival of companies that differ in ownership structure and control: 
independent firms versus subsidiaries (Bradley et al., 2011a), multinational versus local 
subsidiaries (Alfaro and Chen, 2012) and family-controlled versus non-family controlled 
firms (Lins et al., 2013). Third, organisations differ in the ability to leverage and reconfigure 
resources, either internally or externally controlled, in the effort to adapt to changes in the 
environment, what has labelled as adaptive capabilities (Augier and Teece, 2009). These 
represent a subset of dynamic capabilities (Augier and Teece, 2009) as they relate to the 
adaptive behaviour of firms in the face of external changes that are sudden and extreme 
(Grewal and Tansuhaj, 2001; Makkonen et al., 2014).  
Earlier studies on survival during environmental jolts illustrate the implications of 
firm-specific investment decisions and ownership structure (Alfaro and Chen, 2012; Bradley 
et al., 2011a; Clarke et al., 2012). Less is known about heterogeneous adaptive capabilities. 
Hence, we ask which types of capability act as adaptive capabilities to an external shock such 
as the global financial crisis. In particular, we focus on the innovative capabilities of new 
firms, because new firms are the most exposed to the clear and present danger of the crisis. 
Studies examining firm survival in the years preceding the global financial crisis of 2007-
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2009 show that entrepreneurial firms, while facing liabilities of newness and smallness 
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994), are also those that most benefit of an ‘innovation premium’ for 
survival (Cefis and Marsili, 2006), which enhances their survival probabilities. Building on 
this evidence, we are interested in whether innovation not only provides a survival premium 
in the good times but also equip new firms of adaptive capabilities for the bad times. To 
answer this question, we draw on evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982). We 
propose that new firms that innovate at the time of the founding build distinctive and long-
lasting adaptive capabilities, which increase their chances of survival to environmental jolts. 
We also argue that adaptive capabilities vary by type of innovation in a hierarchical order of 
criticality, comparing technological innovations, in products and processes, to managerial 
innovations, in organisational and marketing practices (Ballot et al., 2015; Battisti and 
Stoneman, 2010; Mol and Birkinshaw, 2009). 
In this study, we observe the survival likelihood over the time from 2001 to 2015, for 
a sample of 2329 new firms created in the Netherlands from 2001 to 2006. For this sample, 
by using data from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), we examine how the innovative 
capabilities at the time of the founding influence the likelihood of survival before, during and 
after the 2007-2008 financial crisis. We find that product innovation is a primary source of 
survival during and after the crisis; process innovation has a short-lived positive effect during 
the crisis; organisational innovation and marketing innovation are ancillary or even 
detrimental. We conclude that early capabilities in product innovation, more than in other 
types of managerial innovations, are critical for building long-term resilience.  
Our study contributes to the understanding of organisational adaptation in relation to 
the entrepreneurial process. We highlight how organisational adaptation is shaped by 
founding conditions, by the early ability of new firms to innovate, at a time in which the 
uncertainty of innovation is compounded with the uncertainty of organisational creation. Our 
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study responds to the call made by management scholars and economists to study the impact 
of the global financial crisis from a microeconomic perspective, in contrast to the more 
diffuse macroeconomic approach (Agarwal et al., 2009; Alfaro and Chen, 2012). 
Understanding the sources of organisational adaptation is important for firms who need to be 
prepared and overcome crises that diffuse rapidly in an interconnected and global world, and 
for policy makers who seek to find remedies to a global crisis (Agarwal et al., 2009). This is 
critical for new firms, for two reasons. From a management perspective, new firms need to 
find rapid ways to adapt because of lack of internal slack resources, otherwise available to 
established firms as a buffer to external scarcity (Bradley et al., 2011b). From a policy 
perspective, new firms may need to be sheltered from a storm that undermines them too soon, 
before they can gain legitimacy and develop the complementary assets necessary to 
commercialise their innovative ideas (Gans and Stern, 2003). Appreciating how to shelter in 
the storm can help to maintain alive the entrepreneurial experimentation (Kerr et al., 2014; 
Rosenberg, 1992), which policy makers call upon to boost economic growth and recovery in 
times of crisis (Audretsch et al., 2007; Stern, 2006). Our results identify which innovative 
capabilities are crucial to building adaptive capabilities, necessary to overcome the crisis and 
to successfully recover after the recession. When resources at the macro level are scarce, 
understanding which firms have better chances to survive an environmental jolt can be useful 
to inform the choice of where to concentrate resources, instead of dispersing them among all. 
2. Background and hypotheses 
From an evolutionary perspective, organisational survival is the outcome of the processes of 
selection and learning, in an environment characterised by asymmetries in the distribution of 
heterogeneous resources endowments. This distribution will define the relative position of 
competing organisations along with some dimension of economic performance (e.g. 
productivity, profitability) or fitness (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The positional advantage 
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that derives from the control of heterogeneous resources will shield an organisation from the 
process of natural selection, enhancing survival likelihood (Barnett et al., 1994). In this 
respect, the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm highlights that to produce a sustained 
competitive (i.e. positional) advantage, and therefore to survive in the long term, firms' 
resources need to be valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and not substitutable (Barney, 
1991). While selection operates on existing asymmetries, over time, the relative positions of 
individual firms along the distribution of productivity or fitness levels change per effect of 
adaptation and learning (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Hence, survival likelihood is explained as 
the combined outcome of the intensity of market interactions, operating as a mechanism of 
natural selection, and the heterogeneous rates of firm learning (Dosi et al., 1995)   
Consistent with an evolutionary perspective, innovation influences firm survival 
because innovative outcomes enhance the competitive position or fitness of firms (Banbury 
and Mitchell, 1995; Cefis and Marsili, 2012; Colombelli et al., 2016), while, conversely, 
innovative investments may impose greater risks and uncertainty in outcomes (Buddelmeyer 
et al., 2009; Fernandes and Paunov, 2015). There is evidence that having introduced an 
innovation enhances the probability of firm survival persistently over time, years after the 
innovation has taken place (Cefis and Marsili, 2006). Innovation is a valuable and 
appropriable resource that generates a sustained positional advantage for the firm in a 
competitive context (Barney, 1991). Innovation is also a capability because firms learn how 
to recognise and exploit commercially novel opportunities and how to solve problems, as 
they engage in the process of introducing novel products, processes or practices (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). This cumulatively built knowledge, which includes skills, competences, and 
practices is stored in routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and generates persistence in 
innovative capabilities and outcomes (Cefis, 2003). Such a learning process enhances 
organisation flexibility and adaptability to future changes, either internal or external to the 
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firm. Hence, innovation as a resource and a capability contributes to create both a ‘positional 
advantage’, because innovative firms are rewarded through market selection in view of 
asymmetries in some dimension of performance (or fitness), and an ‘adaptive advantage’, 
because firms with superior innovative capabilities can change their relative position in the 
distribution of performance, through learning and the exploration of new opportunities. While 
the overall importance of innovation for survival is well established in the literature, little is 
known about the distinctive contribution of positional and adaptive mechanisms of survival. 
To isolate the above effects more clearly, we focus on the concept of innovative 
entrepreneurship, which can be defined as the intersection between the process of innovation 
and the process of organisational creation. Innovative entrepreneurship combines two sources 
of uncertainty: one associated with the partly random nature of the innovation process, which 
involves experimentation and learning by trial-and-error (Nelson and Winter, 1982), and the 
other associated with the process of creating new organisations when resources need to be 
leveraged in presence of information asymmetries (Amit et al., 1998) and lack of legitimacy  
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). These sources of uncertainty are mutually reinforcing in innovative 
new firms. Uncertainty and possible disagreement about the value of an innovative idea, due 
to its novelty, can amplify information asymmetries in the factors markets, between an 
entrepreneur and those who own or control resources, thus reinforcing uncertainty in the 
process of assembling resources for setting up a new firm (Dew et al., 2004).  As a 
consequence, new companies seeking to innovate as they are created experience unique and 
more precarious challenges compared to established companies innovating on a routine basis 
(Winter, 1984). The situation of uncertainty on multiple levels, which innovative new firms 
are exposed to and handle at this early and critical stage of their life cycle, may not be 
dissimilar to the uncertainty caused by an external shock. Because learning takes place in 
similarly uncertain settings, it is plausible to assume that the experience of true uncertainty in 
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one situation helps to build flexibility and adaptability to true uncertainty in another. On this 
basis, we assume that innovative capabilities, especially when developed early in the 
organisational life cycle, create adaptive capabilities to future shocks. Hence, our interest is 
in the innovative capabilities that new firms possess at the time of the founding, before the 
environmental jolt occurs, unconditionally on future changes in innovative investments and 
strategies, which they may introduce later on, or in response to the external shock (Amore, 
2015; Archibugi et al., 2013). Accordingly, we choose to study cohorts of new firms created 
before the financial crisis of 2007-2008. For these firms, we first consider how the 
introduction of an innovation at founding influences their survival likelihood ‘on average’ 
over time. This ‘average effect’ indicates the existence of an underlying survival premium 
from an early innovation, across time periods.  Hence, we state: 
Hypothesis 1. Innovative capabilities at founding increase the survival likelihood of new 
firms, before, during and after an environmental jolt. 
 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 is an example of an environmental jolt and offers an 
experimental setting (Meyer, 1982), which can help to disentangle the positional and adaptive 
components in the effect of innovation on firm survival. For example, this approach relying 
on environmental jolts has been applied to study how resources ownership structure 
influences the firm's survival (Bradley et al., 2011a). Specifically, the differentials in survival 
likelihood before, during and after an environmental jolt are indicative of distinct positional 
and adaptive advantages. The underlying argument is that organisations taken by surprise by 
an environmental jolt need to learn fast, and the conditions that enable the flexibility and 
adaptability necessary for survival during and after the shock differ from the conditions 
sustaining a competitive advantage before the shock.  
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We extend this line of reasoning to innovation as a resource and a capability of the 
firm. We begin with the consideration, in line with the argument made by Bradley et al. 
(2011a), that in the face of an environmental jolt, adaptive capabilities become imperative 
and more important than positional advantages. Earlier studies based on evidence preceding 
the financial crisis show that innovation enhances survival likelihood (Cefis and Marsili, 
2012). On this basis, we assume that innovators benefit of a positional premium for survival 
in ‘good times’, under the ordered functioning of competitive forces and the selective 
pressure of a relatively predictable environment (before an environmental jolt occurs). We 
then propose that innovators also benefit from an additional adaptive premium for survival 
for the ‘bad times’ to come, when the selective pressure unexpectedly intensifies and the 
environment suddenly becomes extreme (during and after the environmental jolt).  
The benefits of adaptive capabilities in the face of an environmental jolt are more 
substantial for new firms than for established firms. New firms are more likely to be in ‘clear 
and present danger’ in times of crisis, because of their liabilities of newness and smallness, 
while their longer-lived counterparts enjoy a position of legitimacy and more affluent 
resources bases (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). At the fundamental level, a financial crisis 
exacerbates the financial constraints new firms experience mostly when compared to 
established companies less reliant on external funds (Cowling et al., 2012).   
Following the above line of reasoning, and having assumed, in Hypothesis 1, a 
general survival premium from innovation exists, we then focus on the ‘differential effect’ 
due to the occurrence of an external shock. We consider how the effect of having innovated 
or not at founding, on the survival likelihood of new firms, differs across the three time 
periods: before, during and after the shock. Specifically, we expect that starting an 
organisation with an innovation has a greater influence on survival during and after the 
financial crisis than it does before the crisis. Because observed in correspondence of an 
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environmental jolt, we interpret such a differential effect before, during and after the jolt, as 
the expression of an adaptive survival premium, which adds to an underlying positional 
survival premium of innovative capabilities at founding. Hence, the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2. The effect of innovative capabilities at founding is greater for the survival 
likelihood during and after an environmental jolt than for survival before the jolt.  
 
Innovation takes place in different forms, and the influence of each form on survival can 
differ, being more or less consequential. In the literature on firm survival, there has been a 
focus on the implications of product and process innovations and the underlying R&D 
investments. It has also been shown that companies with capabilities in both process 
innovation and product innovation benefit of an additional premium for survival because of 
complementarities between different forms of innovation (Cefis and Marsili, 2005; 2012). 
Besides product and process innovations, also labelled as ‘technological innovations’ (Battisti 
and Stoneman, 2010), the field of innovation studies has increasingly dedicated attention to 
other forms of ‘non-technological innovations’ or managerial innovations (Mol and 
Birkinshaw, 2009). This approach attempts to gain a more comprehensive understanding of 
innovation, in services and in manufacturing, together with a more refined and systematic 
measurement of innovation in its multiple dimensions (Wengel et al., 2000). The category of 
non-technological or managerial innovations includes changes in organisational and 
marketing practices. Non-technological innovations and technological innovations are 
interrelated, especially in sectors like services (Tether and Tajar, 2008). As a result, 
introducing organisational and marketing innovations often occur in combination and in 
support to product and process innovations, enabling the exploitation of synergies and 
complementarities of some type (Battisti and Stoneman, 2010), with positive outcomes on the 
overall innovative performance of firms (Ballot et al., 2015; Schubert, 2010). Hence, it can 
be expected that both technological and non-technological innovations positively influence 
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survival likelihood. It is possible, however, that the differential effect in times of crisis 
becomes more apparent and critical for technological innovations, because of their more 
fundamental role, as compared to non-technological innovations,  
In fact, organisational and marketing innovations are viewed as less demanding or 
‘soft’ because they involve relational rather than technological changes (Tether and Tajar, 
2008). They play a role functional in support to the success and commercialisation of 
technological innovations (Schubert, 2010). Furthermore, performance's benefits from 
engaging in a variety of innovation forms at the same time may not be straightforward. For 
example, the pursuit of organisational innovation simultaneously to product and process 
innovations appears to reduce the benefits of complementarities between product and process 
innovation. Specifically, performing product and process innovations, without organisational 
innovation, is a better strategy than carrying out the three innovation forms concurrently 
(Ballot et al., 2015). Thus, the benefits of performing more than one form of innovation can 
be outbalanced by the costs and complexity of introducing multiple forms of innovation. At 
the same time, introducing only organisational innovations produces the lowest outcomes in 
terms of economic performance for the firm, as compared to any other possible combination 
of product, process and organisational innovations (Ballot et al., 2015). Overall, earlier 
studies indicate the existence of a hierarchical order among innovation forms, with 
managerial innovations having an ancillary role to technological innovations. Managerial 
innovations can support or complement product and process innovations, but appear to be 
less consequential on their own.  
The hierarchical order in innovation forms may be even more stringent for new firms, 
which typically lack the resources and scale needed to deal with complex and diverse 
innovation projects (Nooteboom, 1994). The net effect between the benefits of multi-level 
innovations and the associated costs and complexity depends on contingent characteristics, in 
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particular, on firm size (Ballot et al., 2015). These costs and complexity can be especially 
difficult to handle by financially constrained new firms in times of crisis. Because new firms 
can rely less on slack resources, as an essential buffering mechanism in times of crisis 
(Bradley et al., 2011b),  they may be forced to restrict investments in potentially attractive 
projects (Campello et al., 2010). Hence, it is plausible that in the face of an environmental 
jolt, creating a hostile and extreme environment, adaptability and survival will ultimately 
depend on fundamental rather than ancillary capabilities. In sum, we assume that, consistent 
with Hypothesis 1, organisational and marketing innovative capabilities at founding increase 
the likelihood of survival on average over time. We also expect, however,  that their 
differential effect during and after a crisis, as compared to before the crisis period, is smaller 
than the differential effect of capabilities in product and process innovations. 
Hypothesis 3. During and after an environmental jolt, the effect of innovative capabilities at 
founding on the survival likelihood of new firms is greater for product and process 
innovations as compared to organisational and marketing innovations.  
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Data description and construction of the sample 
In Europe, the period of economic crisis that started in 2007 took a course that has seen 
distinct stages of decline and partial recovery, through the global financial crisis and the 
Eurozone debt crisis. To analyse how the conditions for the survival of new firms changed 
across the different stages of this long period of economic crisis, we identify three different 
time segments in our data: (i) the pre-crisis period from 2001 to 2006, (ii) the global financial 
crisis in 2007-2010, and (iii) the recovery period in 2011-2015. For the analysis, we employ 
several micro-datasets for companies operating in the Netherlands, collected and managed by 
the Netherlands Central Statistics Office (CBS).   
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Sample. To construct our sample, we started by identifying the population of new 
firms over the period of interest, from the General Business Register (or ABR according to 
the Dutch initials). The ABR includes all the companies registered for fiscal reasons in the 
Netherlands and therefore offers a comprehensive list of the whole population of firms active 
in the country. For these firms, the ABR reports the date in the month a firm is first included 
in the register and the dates in which a firm experiences critical events changing its 
ownership structure. In the ABR, these events are identified by the type of change, whether it 
involves the creation of a new organisational form or the demise of an existing one. When an 
event occurs, it is thus possible to know both its typology and the date of occurrence. As 
events resulting in the entry of a new firm, we consider: greenfield birth; spin-off, entry due 
to the disintegration of an existing firm, merger, entry due to the restructuring of an existing 
firm. Using the date an event occurred, which lead to the first inclusion of a firm in the ABR, 
we can find the population of new firms in 2001-2006.  
From this population of new firms from the ABR, we select those firms for which 
innovation data is available, over the same time period, from the Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS), to obtain information on their innovative capabilities at founding. This is 
possible by using three waves of the CIS: the CIS 3.5, CIS 4 and CIS 2006. Because each 
CIS survey provides innovation data over the three years preceding the year of the 
administration, we select the two most recent entry cohorts within the period covered by each 
survey. Accordingly, for the CIS 3.5 (covering data for 2000-2002) we choose the entry 
cohorts of 2001 and 2002, for the CIS 4 (2002-2004) the entry cohorts of 2003 and 2004, and 
for the CIS 2006 (2004-2006) the entry cohorts of 2005 and 2006. Because in the 
Netherlands the CIS was carried out every two years, instead of every four as in most EU 
countries, this timeframe enables us to have innovation data that fully cover the time of 
observation, from 2001 to 2006, and that are close to the year of firm creation, either in the 
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same or one year after creation, for each entry cohort over such a time period. In other words, 
our sample includes new firms that could have been innovative from onset or could have 
become innovative within maximum two years from creation. 
The CIS sample is a stratified random sample drawn from the ABR (the same dataset 
from which our population of new firms is selected) and is constructed to include firms with 
at least 10 employees. Because of our focus on new firms, the matching with the CIS sample 
implies that only new firms with at least 10 employees at the time of observation are included 
in the final sample. Hence, our final sample excludes new micro firms – as defined according 
to the classification of enterprises by the European Union Commission (2003) –, which did 
not demonstrate a high potential for future growth, in the first few years after creation. This 
final sample comprises 2329 new firms divided by year: 325 in 2001; 278 in 2002; 309 in 
2003; 401 in 2004; 449 in 2005; and 667 in 2006 (Table 1a). 
3.2 Variables  
Our dependent variable is the hazard rate of exit. It defines the probability of exiting the 
market at a certain time, conditional on having survived until that time. For each new firm in 
the sample, the hazard rate is computed over the entire period from its entry in the register 
(the first date is January 2001) to December 2015, the last month of observation, based on the 
yearly files of the ABR, in 2001-2015. As events resulting in the exit of a firm, we consider: 
death, closure due to the disintegration of an existing firm, merger and acquisition (M&A), 
and closure due to the restructuring of an existing firm. 
To compare the hazard of the exit of innovative new firms to non-innovative new 
firms, we match the data from the ABR with the CIS, following each cohort of new firms 
entered the period before the financial crisis, 2001-2006. Specifically, for each entry cohort 
selected, the innovation data are gathered from the wave of the CIS that is the closest to cover 
either the same year or the year immediately after the company entry (see the previous 
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paragraph for precise coupling). With this sequence of CIS waves and entry cohorts, we can 
obtain innovation data that do not overlap over time, while fully covering the time of interest.  
To identify the introduction of different forms of innovation, we use a number of 
dummy variables based on the classification applied in the CIS questionnaire, which, in turns, 
adopts the OSLO Manual definitions of product innovation, process innovation, 
organisational innovation, and marketing innovation (OECD/Eurostat, 2005).  
“A product innovation is the introduction of a good or service that is new or 
significantly improved with respect to its characteristics or intended uses. This includes 
significant improvements in technical specifications, components, and materials, 
incorporated software, user friendliness or other functional characteristics.” 
(OECD/Eurostat, 2005, 48) 
“A process innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly improved 
production or delivery method.  This includes significant changes in techniques, equipment 
and/or software.” (OECD/Eurostat, 2005, 49) 
“A marketing innovation is the implementation of a new marketing method involving 
significant changes in product design or packaging, product placement, product promotion 
or pricing.” (OECD/Eurostat, 2005, 49) 
“An organisational innovation is the implementation of a new organisational method 
in the firm’s business practices, workplace organisation or external relations.” 
(OECD/Eurostat, 2005, 51) 
 Boundaries between the types of innovation are sometimes blurred, for example, there 
could be borderline cases between process innovation and organisational innovation, and 
some innovations may include elements of both types. Both process and organisational 
innovations aim at lowering costs by increasing efficiencies, which the former achieves 
through introducing new equipment and techniques, and the latter through new practices for 
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organising people and work (OECD/Eurostat, 2005). Product innovation and marketing 
innovations share the purpose of increasing sales and market shares by better addressing the 
needs of existing customers or by opening new markets. These two types can coexist when 
existing products are significantly improved by product innovations that alter the 
functionality and use of the product, and of marketing innovations that modify the 
appearance, form or packaging (OECD/Eurostat, 2005). While different types of innovation 
are somewhat concurrent (as revealed by a certain covariance between the categories in Table 
1b), we also want to explore to what extent each of them offers a distinct survival premium.  
To account for the possible overlap between types of innovation and for the effects of 
each specific type, we define two alternative sets of dummy variables, which we enter one or 
the other at the time, but never simultaneously, into the model formulations. In one case, we 
consider a broadly defined ‘Innovator’ dummy variable which is equal to 1 if a firm has 
introduced at least one type of innovation and 0  if the firm has introduced no innovation (i.e. 
the firm is a non-innovator). In the other case, we define a set of four dummy variables, in 
which, for each type, the dummy variable is equal to 1 if the firm has introduced that 
particular type of innovation and equal to 0 otherwise (i.e. the firm is either a non-innovator 
or introduced other types of innovation than the one considered).  
We include several control variables to account for heterogeneity in the likelihood of 
survival, by using data from the ABR. First, we control for firm-specific factors. A covariate 
of firm survival is the firm growth rate (Coad et al., 2013), which is calculated as the relative 
difference in the number of employees, as the measure of firm size, between the time of entry 
and the time of exit (or censoring). Differences in ownership status can also influence the 
decision to exit (Audretsch, 1994; Bradley et al., 2011a). Multi-unit firms are more likely to 
close a subsidiary or a branch than are independently owned firms to close down, because of 
lower costs of exit by multi-unit firms, who can redeploy the resources of the closed unit 
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elsewhere within the organisation. Firms with recoverable capital costs are more likely to exit 
than firms with relatively sunk capital costs (Rosenbaum and Lamort, 1992). Furthermore, 
owners of independent enterprises are willing to accept lower rates of returns, and to keep 
their firm in the market even when underperforming, because of lower opportunity costs due 
to personal circumstance (e.g. lack of education, training and job alternatives), or because of 
strong personal attachment to the business (Audretsch, 1994; Gimeno et al., 1997). Hence, 
we introduce a dummy variable, group, which is set equal to 1 for all firms that, at the time of 
exit (or censoring), are subsidiaries of existing companies, and equal to 0 for those that are 
independently owned1. Second, we control for industry-specific conditions (Anderson and 
Tushman, 2001). In particular, we add the employment growth rate, computed by applying 
the indicator proposed by Haltiwanger et al. (2013), to measure job creation and job 
destruction, including the contribution of entries and exits, at various levels of aggregation. 
We calculate the Haltiwanger index over one year-time period as 𝑔𝑠𝑡 = (𝐸𝑠𝑡 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡−1)/(0.5 ∗
(𝐸𝑠𝑡 + 𝐸𝑠𝑡−1))𝑔𝑗𝑡 = (𝐸𝑠𝑡 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡−1)/(0.5 ∗ (𝐸𝑠𝑡 + 𝐸𝑠𝑡−1)) , where 𝐸𝑠𝑡  is the number of 
employees in sector s at time t (Haltiwanger et al., 2013: 353). The sector s is defined at the 
level of technological macro-sectors according to the Eurostat classification, which capture 
the influence of distinct technological regimes on firm survival (Audretsch, 1991). Also, we 
introduce a set of sectoral dummy variables that group firms into eight categories: 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, energy, water management, knowledge-intensive 
services, less knowledge-intensive services, and other services. We exclude from the analysis 
the following sectors: construction, energy, and public administration because they are, 
respectively, too pro-cycle, too heterogeneous, and not constituted by private firms. Finally, 
we consider entry cohort-specific effects on firm survival, to account for heterogeneity in 
founding conditions common to all firms created in the same year, due to macroeconomic or 
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industry-specific factors (Geroski et al., 2010). Hence, we enter the model cohort dummy 
variables per year of entry, from 2001 to 2006.   
Table 1a reports the exit and survival rates of the six cohorts of new firms in our 
sample. Only one-third of the new firms survive at the end of our period of observation, 
spanning over 14 years. The average survival rate across entry cohorts is about 33%, with a 
minimum of about 26% for the 2002 cohort, and a maximum of about 38% for the 2004 
cohort. Table 1b shows the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of the main 
variables of interest. It is worth noting that just above 53% of the new firms have introduced 
an innovation (of any type) at founding. The innovation most frequently introduced at 
founding is organisational innovation (38%), while the marketing innovation is the least 
(16%). Product and process innovations have been introduced respectively by 26% and 23% 
of the firms in our sample. In more detail, 602 firms have introduced a product innovation, 
and 533 a process innovation. Those firms that have introduced simultaneously both product 
and process innovations at their founding are 355, representing the 15% of the entire sample. 
-- Insert Tables 1a and 1b -- 
As for the correlation coefficients, there is, as expected, some degree of correlation between 
the various forms of innovations, because firms may pursue different types of innovation at 
the same time. Nevertheless, the maximum correlation coefficient for the variables that will 
enter simultaneously into the same model estimation is equal to 0.511, for the combination of 
product and process innovations. This value is below conventional thresholds that would 
warrant concern for multicollinearity (Farrar and Glauber, 1967). The only coefficient above 
the 0.70 threshold of strong correlation is observed between ‘Innovator’ and ‘Organisational 
innovator’ (r=0.729); these variables are never entered simultaneously in any model 




In order to test our hypotheses, we implement a piece-wise exponential hazard model because 
we recognise that the ‘macro’ (or systemic) conditions for operating in the market are 
significantly different across the periods that lie within our observation period 2001-2015. 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2010 is an example of an environmental jolt and offers an 
experimental setting that can help to disentangle the positional and adaptive components in 
the effect of innovation on firm survival. Specifically, we examine the differential effects of 
the founding conditions of new firms, created in the six years preceding the onset of the 
financial crisis, on the hazard rates of exit observed before the crisis, which can be considered 
as the placebo effect (Aghion et al., 2017), during the crisis, and in the years following the 
crisis. These differences, in the conditions underlying firm survival over distinct time periods, 
are taken into consideration by modelling firms' survival according to a proportional hazard 
model, in which the baseline hazard rate is assumed to be constant within each time period, 
but with a value that differs across the time periods (Jenkins, 2005). Following Rodríguez 
(2013), let us consider a proportional hazard model of the form 
 𝜆𝑖(𝑡|𝐱𝑖) = 𝜆0(𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝{𝐱𝐢
′𝜷}, (1) 
imposing mild assumptions on the baseline hazard 𝜆0(𝑡), namely that: (a) the overall time 
period of observation is subdivided into reasonable or appropriate intervals and (b) the 
baseline hazard is assumed to be constant in each interval. These assumptions lead to a piece-
wise exponential model, which constitutes a flexible or semi-parametric approach to fitting a 
survival model. This is intermediate between a parametric approach, in which a specific 
functional form is assumed for the baseline hazard, and a non-parametric approach, in which 
the baseline hazard is left entirely unspecified (Rodríguez, 2013). 
The observation period is partitioned into 𝑗 intervals, with the 𝑗–th interval defined as 
[τj−1, τj), where τ is the time indicator. We choose our j-th intervals, with τ  equal to 3: 
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"Time-period 1 (tp1)" for the pre-crisis period, from January 2001 to December 2006; "Time-
period 2 (tp2)" for the crisis period, from January 2007 to December 2010; and "Time-period 
3 (tp3)" for the recovery period, from January 2011 to December 2015.  
The choice of 1st Jan 2007 and 31st December 2010, as appropriate cut-off points, is 
based on the Life Tables reported in Table 2 and on the hazard function for our sample in 
Figure 1. The Life Tables (columns “Exits t0-t1” and “Hazard” of the “All Exits” section of 
the Table) show distinctly that the number of exits during the period from 1 January 2007 to 
31 December 2010 increases drastically (370 exits in 2007, 162 in 2008, 114 in 2009 and 306 
in 2010) regarding the previous and the following period. Coherently, the hazard rate passes 
from about 0.04 (pre-crisis period) to 0.20 in 2007 arriving at 0.25 in 2010, to decrease again 
in the following years to levels around 0.07. If we graph the hazard function for our sample in 
Figure 1 (left-hand panel), these cut-off points isolate the peak of the hazard function at the 
centre from the left and the right sides, in which the function is markedly lower. These cut-
off points are also visible in Figure 1 (right-hand panel), in correspondence to the two breaks 
of the cumulative hazard function, where the function changes slope. This plot also shows 
that, within the three identified intervals, the cumulative hazard function is approximated by a 
straight line, implying that the assumption of constant hazard rates within the selected time 
periods will not bias the survival estimates.  
-- Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 about here -- 
Having selected the j intervals, we then assume a constant baseline hazard, 𝜆𝑗 , within each 
interval, so that: 
  𝜆0(𝑡) = 𝜆𝑗 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 ∈ [𝜏𝑗−1, 𝜏𝑗). (2)  
We can, therefore, model the baseline hazard using τ  parameters 𝜆1, … , 𝜆𝜏. Each parameter 
represents the risk of the reference group inside a particular time period (Rodríguez, 2013). 
 20 
Given the formulation of the proportional hazard model in equation (1), we can rewrite the 
piece-wise exponential model as: 
 𝜆𝑖𝑗 = 𝜆𝑗 𝑒𝑥𝑝{xi
′𝛽}, (3) 
where 𝜆𝑖𝑗 is the hazard of subject i in the time period j, 𝜆𝑗 is the baseline hazard of such a 
time period, and 𝑒𝑥𝑝{x𝑖
′𝛽} is the relative risk for the subject i, at any given time, compared to 
the baseline, for the covariates' values xi
′. Taking the logs, it yields the additive log-linear 
model 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜆𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎𝑗 + xi
′𝛽, (4) 
where 𝑎𝑗 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜆𝑗. This is the standard log-linear model, in which the time periods are 
considered as regressors. In our case, 𝑎𝑗 is equal to "Time-period 1 (tp1)" for the pre-crisis 
period, "Time-period 2 (tp2)" for the crisis period, and "Time-period 3 (tp3)" for the recovery 
period.  
To test our hypothesis of a differential effect of founding conditions due to a firm’s response 
to the occurrence of an environmental jolt, and thus indicative of organisational adaptive 
capabilities, we estimate two sets of models with standard errors clustered by firm. In the first 
set (Tables 3a and 3b, from Model 1 to Model 6), we assume that the constant baseline 
hazard is different across the three time periods while the effects of all the covariates are 
independent of the time period. In this case, the three time-periods are regressors in the 
model: their estimated coefficients represent the effects of different time periods on the 
(unknown) baseline hazard. Conversely, the estimated coefficients of all the other variables 
are ‘on-average’ effects throughout the entire period of observation, i.e. across the three time-
periods. In the second set of models (Tables 4a and 4b, from Model 7 to Model 13), besides 
assuming that the constant baseline hazard differs across time-periods as above, we also 
allow for the effects of our explanatory variables to vary by the time period. Hence, we add to 
the model the interactions between the variables of interest and each time period. Here, the 
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estimated coefficients report the effect of a specific variable in a specific time period on the 
hazard rate, distinguishing different effects of the same variable across different time-periods.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Univariate Analysis 
Figure 2 reports the survival functions for each entry cohort, estimated separately using the 
Kaplan-Meier estimator. This is a non-parametric estimator of the survival function, also 
known as the product-limit estimator, and it considers right-censored observations, as in our 
case.   
-- Insert Figure 2 about here -- 
In Figure 2, the estimated survival rates are reported by year, as on the x-axis, and for this 
reason, the plots appear as step-functions with discontinuities, dropping when the total 
number of failures is observed per year. In all the plots, the survival function displays two 
more marked drops consistent with our assumption of differential survival conditions over 
the three time periods. Regardless of the cohort, the survival functions show that after 10-15 
years from start (depending on which cohort), approximately 25% - 30% of the starting 
cohort of firms survives, with a survival rate that seems to stabilise 10 years after entry. In 
other words, 1 out of 3, in the most resilient cohorts, or 1 out of 4, in the others, of our high-
potential new firms survive after 10 years. Usually, economic and policy institutions at 
different level identify these firms as an important driver for economic growth, especially 
during recession times. Consequently, it could be useful to know which ones are more likely 
to survive an environmental jolt. 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
Table 3a and 4a report the estimated coefficients (and clustered standard errors) of the piece-
wise exponential hazard models, over the period from 2001 to 2015. We start with a 
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comparison of the coefficients of the time dummies identifying the three time periods of 
interest, before, during, and after the 2007-2008 crisis. The estimates of the effects of the 
time periods on the hazard rate or (conditional) failure rate2 are consistent throughout all the 
model specifications in significance, sign, and magnitude. The coefficients are all negative 
and statistically significant (p<0.01), ranging from -3.638 to -3.412 for the pre-crisis period 
(Time-period 1), from -2.211 to -2.338 for the crisis period (Time-period 2) and from -3.113 
to -2.986 in the post-crisis period (Time-period 3). Thus, the hazard rate is closest to the 
baseline hazard in the crisis period, it drops somewhat in the post-crisis period, and it falls to 
the lowest level in the pre-crisis period. Hence, the survival chances are most favourable 
before the crisis, worsen during the crisis, and partially recover after the crisis, without 
nevertheless returning to the pre-crisis values. This pattern confirms our basic assumption 
that the 2007-2008 financial crisis has been actually an environmental jolt which firms had to 
face in order to survive. 
Our first interest is in establishing the influence on the survival likelihood of 
innovative capabilities at founding (Hypothesis 1), defined broadly as the ability to innovate, 
and thus encompassing the ability to innovate by specific forms of innovation. Table 3a 
reports the estimates for various specifications of the model, in which the independent 
variables are not interacted with the time regressors. This formulation implies that the effects 
of the independent variables are averaged across the three periods (before, during and after 
the crisis) and provides the indication of the positional survival premium which can be 
attributed to the ability of a new firm to innovate at founding. This is the premium given by 
innovation at the time of the founding regardless of the specific context or moment in time 
for survival. 
-- Insert Table 3a about here -- 
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The estimates of the innovator dummy in Model (1) in Table 3a show that innovative new 
firms created before the financial crisis experienced lower hazard rates of exit than non-
innovative new firms, on average across the three time periods. In Models (2) and (3), which 
include each type of technological innovation separately, the effect of lowering the hazard 
rate is slightly higher for product innovation (= -0.231, p < 0.01) than for process innovation 
(= -0.205, p<0.01). The coefficients remain negative and statistically significant, when 
entering both types of innovation into the same model formulation in Model (4), as well, with 
a slightly greater effect for product innovation (= -0.175, p<0.05)  than process innovation 
(= -0.123, p<0.10).3 Thus, we find that the capability to introduce technological innovations 
at founding lower the exit rate years after entry, with a somewhat greater role for capabilities 
in product innovation than in process innovation.  
We then evaluate the influence of managerial innovations by adding organisational 
innovation in Model (5), and marketing innovation in Model (6), which is also the complete 
model with all four types of innovation. In both models, the coefficient for organisational 
innovations is not statistically significant. Somewhat surprisingly, in Model (6), the effect of 
marketing innovation is to increase the hazard rate of exit for new firms, although with a 
marginally statistically significant coefficient (=0.126, p < 0.10). In this most 
comprehensive formulation, the strongest effect is observed for product innovation (= - 
0.197, p < 0.01), and somewhat lower for process innovation (= - 0.123, p < 0.10).  
In sum, innovative capabilities, as broadly defined by the ‘innovator’ dummy 
variable, have a positive and long-lasting effect on the survival likelihood of firms, years 
after they have been created, consistent with Hypothesis 1. The survival time ranges from a 
minimum value of one year after funding, to 14 years after founding (for a firm created in 
2001 and surviving until 2015). As a necessary condition for Hypothesis 1, one would also 
expect that the same relationship holds for each type of innovation. In contrast, we observe 
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notable differences when separating product, process, organisational and marketing 
innovations. While capabilities in product and process innovation increase the survival 
likelihood of new firms consistent with Hypothesis 1, innovative capabilities in marketing 
lower survival, contrary to the hypothesis. Innovative capabilities in organisational practices 
do not significantly alter the chances of survival, on average over time. Because the effect on 
survival varies in sign by type of innovation, our results only partly support Hypothesis 1. 
-- Insert Table 3b about here -- 
In order to rapidly evaluate the effects sizes of the relationships described above, Table 3b 
reports the hazard ratios, equal to exp(), for the main effects of interest in the estimated 
models. Focusing on the statistically significant effects only, and starting with the most 
comprehensive definition of innovation (Model 1), we observe that innovative new firms 
experience hazard rates 17.1% lower than non-innovative new firms, on overage over the 
three time periods (the hazard ratio is below 1). When distinguishing the innovations types in 
the complete model (Model 6), the hazard rate of exit is 17.9% lower for product innovation, 
11.6% lower for process innovation, and 13.4% higher for marketing innovation (the hazard 
ratio is above 1). 
The previous results refer to the average effects of the explanatory variables across 
the three time periods of interest. In this formulation, each time period has an effect on the 
intercept of the model by differentiating the baseline hazard rate but does not change the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables. The next step is to allow those coefficients to vary 
with the time periods as the variation would reflect how the financial crisis affects the 
relationship between survival and innovative capabilities (Hypotheses 2 and 3). For this 
purpose, Table 4a reports the estimates of the model which includes the interaction terms 
between the innovation variables and the dichotomic variables corresponding to the three 
time periods. The interaction terms bring to light how the effects of innovation at founding 
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vary over time, before the crisis, during the crisis, and in the recovery stage. The comparison 
in the interaction terms estimated during and after the crisis period gives, regarding the period 
preceding the crisis, provides an indication of the existence of an adaptive survival premium 
given by innovation to firms that have innovated at their founding. When estimated during 
and after the crisis, the interaction coefficients reflect the combination of an adaptive and a 
positional component which we are not able to disentangle entirely, since we cannot establish 
what would have happened without the crisis. Nevertheless, observing an effect during and 
after a crisis, which is not present before the crisis reveals the existence of this adaptive 
premium. 
-- Insert Table 4a about here -- 
Model (7) shows the effect of being an innovator at founding, independent of the type of 
innovation when the effect is differentiated over the three periods. Here we observe that the 
coefficient of the interaction term between the Innovator variable and the time period is 
negative and statistically significant, lowering the hazard rate of exit, during the shock (time 
period 2), while it is not statistically significant before the shock (time period 1) and after the 
shock (time period 3).  
To better qualify the previous result in which the coefficient of the Innovator variable 
reflects the combined effect of different types of innovation, we distinguish the model 
formulation by type of innovation (Models 8 to 13). Starting with technological innovations, 
in Model (8), we find that introducing product innovation at founding lowers the hazard rate 
of exit during the crisis ( = -0.332, p<0.01), as well in the recovery period, although with 
lower statistical significance ( = -0.230, p<0.10). In Model (9), introducing process 
innovation lowers the hazard rate only during the crisis ( = -0.420, p<0.01) with no 
statistically significant effects on the other time periods. Interestingly, when the two types of 
technological innovations are entered simultaneously in the equation (Model 10), the above 
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coefficients remain statistically significant, and the effect of product innovation becomes 
more important over time, as the reduction in hazard rates is stronger in the recovery period 
( = -0.358, p<0.05) than during the crisis ( = -0.180, p<0.05). Conversely, process 
innovation lowers the hazard rate even more notably than product innovation during the crisis 
(= -0.338, p<0.01), but the effect is short-lived, as the estimated coefficient is not 
statistically significant in the stage of recovery. Moving to non-technological innovation, in 
Model (11), we observe that, as expected, organisational innovation lowers the hazard rates 
during the crisis (= -0.261, p<0.01), but, surprisingly, it increases the hazard rates in the 
period before the crisis (=0.294, p<0.01). Finally, in Model (12), for marketing innovation, 
we find none statistically significant effect on the hazard rate, in any of the three time 
periods, when the variable is entered separately.  
The above pattern remains broadly consistent when all the innovation forms are 
included simultaneously and interacted with the time regressors, in the complete Model (13). 
This formulation accounts for the fact that firms may introduce combinations of multiple 
forms of innovation at once. All the coefficients that were statistically significant in the 
previous models for product and process innovation (Model 10) and for organisational 
innovation (Model 11) maintain the same sign, statistical significance, and approximately the 
same value, in the complete model (Model 13). The only exception is the effect of marketing 
innovation at founding. While its coefficient is not statistically significant when considered 
separately from other innovation types (Model 12), it becomes statistically significant, with a 
positive sign for the time period 2, in the complete model, indicating that the capabilities of 
new firms in marketing innovation increase the hazard rate in times of crisis (= 0.232, 
p<0.05). 
-- Insert Table 4b about here – 
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In order to assess effect sizes, Table 4b reports the hazard ratios for the interaction terms with 
the main variables of interest. Focusing only on the statistically significant effects, we 
observe, that, for the most comprehensive definition of innovative capabilities (Model 7), 
being an innovator at founding lowers the hazard of exit of about 29% during the financial 
crisis, compared to an average reduction of 17.1% throughout the period of observation, from 
2001 to 2015 (Table 3b). When accounting for the different types of innovative capabilities in 
the complete model (Model 13), we observe that the hazard of exit, during the financial 
crisis, is 18.3% lower for new firms that introduced product innovation at founding, 26.5% 
lower if they introduced process innovation, 18.3% lower for organisational innovators, and 
26.1% higher for marketing innovators. As for the recovery period, product innovation is the 
only type of innovation with a statistically significant effect, lowering the hazard of the exit 
of about 28%. Before the crisis, the hazard rate is only affected by capabilities in 
organisational innovation, with a value that is 31% higher for innovators. 
Overall, the findings show that product innovation capabilities at founding have the 
most enduring effect in favouring the survival of new firms during and after an 
environmental jolt. Process innovation capabilities have a similar effect but only during and 
not after the jolt. Organisational innovation capabilities have a more complex effect: they 
increase survival during an environmental jolt only for the new firms that overcome the early 
risks of exit associated with this type of innovation. Marketing innovation capabilities even 
lower the likelihood of survival during the jolt. It is important to note that all these early 
innovative capabilities, with the only exception of organisational innovation, which even 
increases the early risk of exit, do not appear to affect the survival of new firms in the years 
that go from their entry to the onset of the financial crisis. Thus, the positive effect on the 
survival of innovation at founding is not clear at the early stage of the life cycle, and it 
becomes manifest only during the crisis, consistent with Hypothesis 2. Also, the evidence 
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supports our Hypothesis 3 that technological innovations at founding generate stronger 
adaptive capabilities than non-technological innovations. While the former types have the 
effect of consistently increasing survival, the latter types exert a differentiated or even a 
detrimental effect on survival.   
As for the control variables, we observe a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient of firms' growth rate (with p < 0.01) across all the model specifications (Table 3a 
and 4a) consistent with earlier findings (Coad et al., 2013). The estimated coefficient for the 
variable group is positive and statistically significant (with p < 0.01) with a magnitude 
relatively invariant across all the versions of the model. Hence, new firms that are 
subsidiaries of established companies at the moment of the exit, when deciding to exit, 
display higher hazard rates than independent new firms. This confirms earlier evidence 
(Audretsch, 1994) suggesting that the costs of exit are lower for subsidiaries than for 
independent new firms. A parent company can more easily close a subsidiary because it can 
redeploy resources (employees, equipment etc.) within the organisation. In contrast, the 
personal attachment of entrepreneurs to their own company or the absence of alternative job 
opportunities increase opportunity costs, so entrepreneurs may postpone the decision to close 
a business even when this is performing poorly (Gimeno et al., 1997).  
4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
We perform a sensitivity analysis to check whether the decision to consider the different 
types of exit as a single one may, in some ways, bias our results. In particular, we check 
whether including the exit by M&A in the general definition of exit implies that we do not 
take into consideration the different meaning that exiting by M&A might have in contrast to 
exiting by closure. Therefore, we estimate all the previous models considering M&A as the 
only type of exit. Technically, this means that M&As are identified as the only cause of 
‘failure’ while the other types of exit are considered as ‘exits’ from the sample observation. 
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This approach has the advantage of calculating the hazard rate with respect to a reference 
group that maintains the same numerosity as the reference group used to estimate the hazard 
rate in the original model specifications, as in the previous section, thus allowing for 
comparison among the results. Table 5 reports the average effects of innovation on the hazard 
rate. The results are much in line with the one obtained considering all types of exit 
altogether (Table 3a), giving support to our decision to consider M&A similar to the other 
exits. The only substantial difference is the size of the innovation variables coefficients which 
is about two times the size of the same coefficients when considering all the exits together. In 
general, we can say innovation reduced the hazard rate of exit by M&A.  
-- Insert Table 5 and 6 about here -- 
Table 6 analyses the differential effects of innovation variables in the three-time periods 
considered. The two most important results are that product innovations strongly reduce the 
hazard rate during and after the crisis (as in Table 4a), while process innovation is only 
statistically significant in the period of recovery. It is worth noting that the magnitude of the 
product innovation coefficients is about 3 times larger than the ones estimated in Table 4a. 
Again these results support our decision to consider M&A together with the other exits. 
However, if we consider earlier analysis conducted on different exit forms and the innovative 
capabilities of firms in the Netherlands during ‘good times’, in the period 1996 – 2003 (Cefis 
and Marsili, 2011; 2012), it is striking the difference we can notice among the effects of 
innovation on the probability of exit by M&A. In fact, during a period characterised by 
economic stability (or better, by the absence of an exogenous crisis), product innovations 
enhance firms' exit by M&A, suggesting that acquisitions can be a ‘positive’ form of exit. 
One possible interpretation, supported by the statistics shown in the Life Tables (Table 2; 
Column "Acquisition") is that, during the crisis, selling a firm was not a synonymous for 
cashing out and harvesting the entrepreneurial profits of having founded and developed an 
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innovative firm, but, on the contrary, it was a way to avoid failure due to the crisis. In fact, 
the Life Tables show that most M&As happened in a wave during the year 2010, in which 
227 M&As were concluded against 79 in 2007 at the beginning of the crisis, and less than 45 
in all other years). These figures could suggest that some new firms, which tried hard to 
overcome the crisis, were not able to survive long enough, also because in Europe the crisis 
prolonged until later with respect to the United States. Ultimately, they were ‘forced’ to sell 
out and exit the market by an acquisition. 
 
5. Conclusions and Discussion 
In this study, we examine how founding innovative capabilities of new firms created in the 
six years preceding the onset of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 influence their 
likelihood of survival. In particular, we are interested in the existence of the differential 
effects of the same founding conditions: when the effects are observed before the crisis, as 
placebo effects (Aghion et al., 2017) during the crisis, when adaptive capabilities become 
essential, and in the years following the crisis, when adaptive capabilities can also help 
recovery. Our results show that there are differential effects across the time periods and by 
type of innovative capabilities. Specifically, we find that, while introducing product and 
process innovation at founding do not affect the likelihood of survival in the years that span 
from firm creation to the onset of the financial crisis, those same innovative capabilities help 
firms to survive during the crisis. We interpret this differential as indicative of the emergence 
of adaptive capabilities to environmental jolts that stem from innovative capabilities 
developed at the early stage of a firm’s life cycle. Capabilities in product innovations result 
especially important, as their differential effect on survival prolongs also to the period of 
recovery from the crisis. Conversely, introducing organisational innovations at founding 
displays a more differentiated effect. It influences survival both before and during the 
financial crisis, but with opposite sign effect, positive (increasing the hazard of exit) before 
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the crisis and negative (reducing the hazard of exit) after the crisis. Hence, while early 
capabilities in organisational innovation can lead to adaptive capabilities to an external shock, 
this only happens for firms that have overcome the increased risk of exit that is associated 
with far-reaching and complex changes involving organisational practices and structures, 
when the organisation is still young. Finally, marketing innovation capabilities at founding do 
not generate adaptive capabilities to an environmental jolt, but, instead, they exacerbate the 
risk of exit during the jolt. 
Our first conclusion is that innovative capabilities at founding act as adaptive 
capabilities. Innovative capabilities that emerge early in the life cycle of firms, when they 
face the uncertainty of building a new organisation, while also innovating, equip them with a 
survival premium when they need to deal with sudden changes in the environment, years 
later. Innovative capabilities at founding increase resilience in the face of an environmental 
jolt and, sometimes, during recovery. By highlighting how founding conditions imprint 
organisational adaption to (future) changes in the environment, our results confirm and 
qualify the role of founding conditions as ‘markers’ for the survival of new firms (Geroski et 
al., 2010). We show that the specific conditions in which new firms are created, in good 
times, continue to shape later on, in bad times, those heterogeneous capabilities they draw 
upon to respond to an external shock, like the financial crisis (Agarwal et al., 2009).  
Second, our findings suggest that not all innovative capabilities are adaptive 
capabilities, but this depends on the form of innovation. In fact, early capabilities in 
marketing innovation are associated with greater risks of failure during an environmental jolt. 
The ability to change marketing practices and relationships with customers can occur to be 
even detrimental for survival to an external shock driven by demand. When demand for 
existing products is falling rapidly and dramatically, recurring to changes in the way firms 
approach customers in their current market may provide little benefit. In this context, 
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investments in marketing strategies may add non-essential costs to already financially 
constrained firms and enhance risks. Conversely, our study would suggest that it is the ability 
to create and exploit new market opportunities, and potentially to attract new customers, 
through product innovations that can help firms to overcome a demand shock. As for other 
forms, such as organisational innovations, these appear to be too risky for newly created 
firms. Only once new firms have been in the market long enough, overcoming early 
liabilities, capabilities in organisational innovation can help them to be more resilient and 
adapt to sudden changes in the environment. We also find evidence that capabilities in 
product and process innovations entail superior adaptive capabilities than those in marketing 
and organisational innovations. This result is consistent with the notion that the performance 
effects of managerial (or non-technological) innovations may not be as strong and direct as 
those of technological innovations (Ballot et al., 2015).  
Finally, our results indicate that adaptive capabilities have a different reach over time. 
In fact, among all innovation forms at the time of the founding, only the introduction of 
product innovations increases the likelihood of survival in the long run, extending over the 
period of (tentative) recovery from the crisis. Even more so, its effect strengthens over time, 
from the crisis to its aftermath. This pattern confirms and qualifies the role of entrepreneurial 
experimentation for economic growth and prosperity (Stern, 2006). It proves that recovery 
from a shock, such as the financial crisis, depends on the resilience of entrepreneurial firms, 
which early in life develop capabilities in product innovations focusing on experimentation. 
Conversely, relying on efficiency and cost-saving improvements (product innovation) or on 
changes in managerial practices (organisational innovation) can help young firms to survive 
the onset of a financial crisis, but does not sustain their survival in the longer term. 
Our study presents some limitations. First, it focuses on a specific type of adaptive 
capabilities, which are the innovative capabilities of new firms in the first or second year of 
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life, without considering innovations that could be introduced later on by the same firms, and 
in response to the financial crisis (Amore, 2015; Archibugi et al., 2013). Our goal was to 
show how organisational adaptation is shaped by capabilities imprinted early in a firm’s life 
cycle, without possible sources of sample attrition in the analysis. Taking this into account, 
our study could be extended by incorporating changes in adaptive capabilities, which 
originate from the innovative investments and activities companies undertake during and 
after the crisis. Second, we assume that observing a differential effect of founding conditions, 
between the pre-crisis period and the crisis period, is equivalent to observe an additional 
‘adaptive survival premium’ to an underlying ‘positional survival premium’. Our goal was to 
show how an external shock can elicit certain types of adaptive capabilities, which are critical 
for survival in bad times, in addition to the positional advantage already manifest in good 
times. As for the measurement of the specific effects sizes, during the crisis, we can, 
however, only observe the total effect size, because the adaptive component is superimposed 
to the positional component of the premium. It would then be valuable to extend our model 
with proxies that measure the ‘positional advantage’ of a firm, in terms of its technological 
and market leadership, as distinct from its ‘adaptive advantage’, in terms of organisational 
flexibility and responsiveness acquired by each firm, in each period, and coming from their 
innovative activities. Including in the model the effects of distinct forms of innovative 
activities and outcomes, as they occur over time and not only at founding, can help to 
disentangle these specific advantages in each period. Thus, an interesting direction of further 
research would be to study new firm survival in conjunction with the persistence of 
innovation (Cefis, 2003; Cerulli and Potì, 2013)  
From a policy perspective, the most worrying threat of a financial crisis is to halt that 
process of entrepreneurial experimentation, which is essential to promote economic growth 
and to boost the system out of a recession (Audretsch et al., 2007). As earlier studies reveal, 
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the global financial crisis has caused firms to shrink their overall investments in innovation 
(Archibugi et al., 2013), to stop ongoing innovation projects (Paunov, 2012), and to revise 
their plans for technology spending (Campello et al., 2010). Our results are important in light 
of this evidence and policy concerns. Policy interventions aimed at actively encouraging 
corporate investments in innovation, to sustain entrepreneurial experimentation, are costly 
and uncertain in outcomes. Our results point out that firms with innovative capabilities at the 
start are able to navigate the crisis more successfully and can compete persistently in the 
phase of recovery, and this outcome is unconditional on their investment decisions during 
and after the crisis. Furthermore, our results identify the type of innovative capabilities that 
are most effective for building the adaptive capabilities necessary to overcome and pull out of 
the crisis. Yet, new firms that do have these necessary adaptive capabilities are also fragile in 
the face of a financial crisis, because of the liabilities of newness and smallness undermining 
survival in the aftermath of a sudden and disruptive shock. The challenge for policies aimed 
at supporting entrepreneurship, as a driver for economic recovery and growth, is to select the 
high potential firms which can provide a greater contribution, separating them from other 
‘marginal’ entrepreneurial firms (Nightingale and Coad, 2014). Our study focuses on a set of 
new firms that have already overcome early liabilities and reached a non-marginal level of 
employment. Our results demonstrate that, for this set of firms, founding conditions can 
lower the information asymmetry surrounding the policy maker’s choice of whom to fund 
(Hall, 2002), by signalling the firm long-term resilience and ability to adapt. This signal is 
especially clear and discernible for new firms that start with innovative product ideas. A 
policy approach that shelters these firms from the storm of a financial crisis could help to 
maintain alive the process of entrepreneurial experimentation during the crisis and to boost 
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Table 1a. Number of new firms, exits, surviving firms, and relative rates, by entry cohort  
Cohort year Cohorts - N Exit - N Exit rate Survival - N Survival rate 
2001 325 224 68.92% 101 31.08% 
2002 278 205 73.74% 73 26.26% 
2003 309 201 65.05% 108 34.95% 
2004 301 187 62.13% 114 37.87% 
2005 449 303 67.48% 146 32.52% 
2006 667 431 64.62% 236 35.38% 
  2329 1551 66.60% 778 33.40% 
 
 
Table 1b. Means, standard deviations and correlation matrix 
 
VARIABLES Mean St. Dev. Growth     Haltiw ind.      Group Inn.           Product Process     Organis.   Market. 
Growth rate -0.219 1.152 1     
Haltiwanger ind. -0.152 0.278 0.017 1   
Group (exit) 0.463 0.499 0.012 -0.037* 1  
lnnovator 0.532 0.499 0.018 -0.101* 0.112* 1 
Product lnn. 0.265 0.441 0.039* -0.098* 0.064* 0.564* 1    
Process lnn. 0.235 0.424 0.022 -0.047* 0.102* 0.520* 0.511* 1   
Organisational lnn. 0.376 0.485 -0.009 -0.075* 0.115* 0.729* 0.318* 0.325* 1  
Marketing lnn. 0.159 0.366 0.030* -0.030* 0.059* 0.409* 0.351* 0.277* 0.358* 1 





Table 2. Life Tables 
   ALL EXITS  ACQUISITIONS 
t0 t1 Existing t0 exits t0-t1 hazard   exits t0-t1 hazard 
01-gen-03 31-dic-03 2329 57 .0247772  27 .0117366 
01-gen-04 31-dic-04 2272 57 .0254067  15 .006686 
01-gen-05 31-dic-05 2215 97 .0447727  44 .0203093 
01-gen-06 31-dic-06 2118 84 .0404624  10 .004817 
01-gen-07 31-dic-07 2034 370 .2001082  79 .0427258 
01-gen-08 31-dic-08 1664 162 .1023373  42 .0265319 
01-gen-09 31-dic-09 1502 114 .0788927  31 .0214533 
01-gen-10 31-dic-10 1388 306 .2477733  227 .1838057 
01-gen-11 31-dic-11 1082 75 .0718047  25 .0239349 
01-gen-12 31-dic-12 1007 70 .0720165  21 .0216049 
01-gen-13 31-dic-13 937 64 .0707182  26 .0287293 
01-gen-14 31-dic-14 873 52 .0613932  12 .0141677 


















Table 3a. Piecewise exponential model of hazard rates, with time period-specific effects  




Table 3b. Hazard ratios in the model formulations with time period-specific effects 
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Table 4a. Piecewise exponential model of hazard rates with time period-specific effects 
Dep. Variable: hazard rate of exit 
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Table 5. Piecewise exponential model of hazard rates with time period-specific effects, and 









Table 6. Piecewise exponential model of hazard rates with time period-specific effects, and 




1 In our dataset, a firm exiting as a subsidiary is necessarily also a firm born as a subsidiary, 
because, otherwise we would have observed its exit as an ‘exit by acquisition'. If it was born as an 
independent firm, it had to be acquired before becoming a subsidiary of an existing firm.  
2 The hazard rate is also called a "(conditional) failure rate" since the denominator (i.e., the 
population survivors) converts the expression into a conditional rate, given survival past time: h(t)= 
f(t) / 1-F(t) where 1-F(t) is the population survivors. We will refer to the hazard rate in the text also 
as exit rate (instead of failure rate) to highlight that we do observe firms' exits of the markets that do 
not always coincide with firms' failure.  
3 It is worth noting that despite the predictor variables for the introduction of product and process 
innovations display the highest correlation between innovation types (equal to 0.511 in Table 1b), 
the estimated coefficients and standard errors remain relatively stable in Model 4, in which both 
predictors are entered simultaneously, as compared to Models 2 and 3, in which one or the other 
predictor is removed from the equation. This confirms that the correlation between the two 
predictors does not raise concerns for multicollinearity. 
                                                 
